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COMMENT
JAMES W.

CEASER*

Professor Schlesinger began by expressing his concern about
the frivolous character of many previous bicentennial programs.
From the tenor of his speech, he must evidently believe that their
dignity is enhanced by turning them into forums for attacks on the
President of the United States.
Professor Schlesinger did, of course, oblige us in the first part
of his paper with an excursion into constitutional theory. But his
heart seemed to lay elsewhere, and he only warmed to his subject
when, midway through his speech, he got around to Reagan-bashing-or, to use his more delicate language, "crippling" the President. President Reagan, we learn, has conducted a foreign policy of
"international recklessness and deceit." A few other mild descriptions follow: "incoherent, incompetent, duplicitous, and dedicated
to rash mindless policies." This flourish might be dismissed as an
exuberant emanation of a very mature partisanship except for the
fact that Professor Schlesinger does finally return to the plane of the
Constitution. The climax to which his crescendo builds is the
charge that President Reagan willfully violated the laws and the
Constitution. Professor Schlesinger does not utter the "I" wordimpeachment-but his analysis would hardly discourage others
from pursuing that course.
Certainly no one could object to a discussion of contemporary
issues at a bicentennial conference when, as is the case today, those
issues have a bearing on fundamental constitutional questions.. But
I believe we would be better served if we regard these questions as
open to inquiry rather than as neatly settled. Instead of focusing
only on whether this administration violated a list of some eight or
ten laws, we should also be asking whether the very existence of
some of these laws violates the Constitution by delimiting far too
narrowly the proper degree of executive discretion in the conduct of
foreign affairs. By violating the Constitution, incidentally, I do not
only have in mind instances in which something is brought up
before a court and declared unconstitutional. This represents an all
too legalistic understanding of the Constitution. The most impor* Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia. B.A., Kenyon College, 1967; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1976.
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tant constitutional questions may never reach, and usually should
not reach, the courts. Constitutional questions are fundamentally
questions of the correct division of power according to the Constitution, and the most controversial of these issues often have been settled, and should be settled, by political means, in and through the
presentation of constitutional arguments that are decided ultimately
by the American people.
When Professor Schlesinger prepared his address a few weeks
ago, just as the Iran-Contra Committee hearings were beginning, he
may have believed that his understanding of the Constitution was
riding a wave of popularity so strong and irresistible that it could be
taken for granted. Everyone agreed, or seemed to agree, that we
were seeing a reaction to the excess of Presidential power, and that
the purpose of the entire exercise, apart from humbling the President, was to confirm a view of the Constitution to the effect that we
had an evil Executive flouting the duly passed laws of Congress. But
the context has changed. The testimonies of Colonel North and Admiral Poindexter before the select committees reminded the Nation
of a different view of the nature of our system of government and its
allocation of fundamental powers. From the mire of shredded documents, concealments, bad judgments, and possible profiteering,
and from the muck of narrow partisanship, character assassination,
and pompous moralism, has somehow emerged an important constitutional question. It is a question not on this or that legislative
provision or executive action, but on the way foreign policy will be
conducted in the future. And it has emerged, finally, in a way that
counts-not as a matter restricted to technicalities or legalisms to be
decided by a few experts, but as a broad debate about the nature of
our system of government to be decided before the American people. The debate about the meaning of our Constitution, far from
being over, has just begun, and no one yet can know its final
resolution.
If we are to engage in this debate in a spirit that does justice to
its importance, we must clear away certain aspects of conventional
wisdom that pass today as incontrovertible fact. Take, for example,
the standard history of institutional relations of the past two decades
offered by Professor Schlesinger. In his view, we had an imperial
Presidency in the 1970s which was then brought to its knees by a
reaction in the wake of Watergate. That reaction held sway until
1980, when it was reversed under President Reagan. Since then we
have seen the reconstitution of another imperial Presidency. And
now, of course, it is time to roll up our sleeves and once again
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join forces with Professor Schlesinger to deflate these imperial
pretensions.
This view, I would submit, is more fantasy than history. If it is
true that President Reagan has been (or was) more adept at exercising power than his predecessors, this hardly justifies the conclusion
that the underlying power structure has dramatically swung back in
favor of the President. The history of institutional relations, as I
view it, does not show that the era of congressional power in foreign
affairs was reversed in 1980. Congress has continued to hold its
own, retreating in some areas while advancing in others. The Boland Amendment, after all, was passed before, not after, the IranContra affair. Whatever else one might want to say about the IranContra affair, it is clear that those who attempted to carry out the
administration's policy were operating under very strict congressional constraints. Otherwise, they wouldn't have had to expend so
much creative energy in trying to get around them. I find it difficult
to believe we have an imperial Presidency when, for good or ill, it is
so difficult-and, under Professor Schlesinger's analysis, technically
illegal-for a President of the United States to swap arms with a few
revolutionary "pragmatists."
We will also not be able to confront the current debate if we
attempt to draw our conclusions about the proper degree of constitutional authority from the wisdom of its exercise in any specific
case. A constitutional debate is a debate about the wisdom of certain capacities judged in light of whether they are important or necessary. It is not a debate about whether such capacities have been
used well or poorly in one case. Clearly, if we were to condemn a
power because it can be used incompetently, we would never grant
any capacity at all. The first major Presidential decision I can recall
as a child, President Kennedy's ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion, stands
as one of the more incompetent decisions of modern times, a conclusion that I believe can easily be drawn from a reading of Professor Schlesinger's history of the Kennedy administration. It does not
necessarily follow, however, that it would have been wise to cripple
President Kennedy for the duration of his administration. Nor do I
recall Professor Schlesinger ever recommending that we do so.
So I ask you then to focus on the real constitutional question
here. Whether you happen to think that the President's decision in
the Iran-Contra affair was ill-conceived is not the issue. What is at
issue is whether you believe that a President should possess the
power to make a decision of this kind, and whether you conceive
that the existence of this power is not just a matter of congressional
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discretion, but a question on which the Constitution itself may offer
some guidance.
Let us then turn to the constitutional questions at issue. Professor Schlesinger's view of our constitutional allocation of powers can
be summed up, I believe, under two main theses. First, Professor
Schlesinger argues that the framers' objective in the allocation of
powers under the Constitution was to maintain liberty. He describes the framers' intent as that of a search to keep liberty while
willingly sacrificing efficiency in policymaking. Second, Professor
Schlesinger regards the allocation of powers among the institutions
not as reflecting any coherent theory of the nature of different powers, but as a mixing and blending of all powers to ensure against
despotism. He cites Professor Neustadt's claim that ours is a government of "separated institutions sharing power." I hope I do not
distort Professor Schlesinger's interpretation if I say that in his understanding the framers' doctrine of separation of powers is about
the same thing as their doctrine of checks and balances.
This interpretation of the Constitution, I believe, is partial and
overstated, to the point that it obscures our understanding of the
intentions of the framers and conceals much that is important about
our system of government. A more complete view, in my judgment,
will emerge from considering the following propositions.
First, the framers' objective in their allocation of power among
the institutions was not only to ensure liberty but to promote efficiency. They warned against a concentration of power in one institution, particularly the legislature, not just because of the danger of
legislative despotism, but because of a concern for legislative incompetence, especially in the conduct of matters relating to foreign policy and national security. Accordingly, the framers' objective with
respect to the Presidency was to create an instrumentality that could
operate with unity, energy, and secrecy in foreign affairs. Of course,
liberty was on the minds of the framers but so, too, were energy and
security. The "story" of the founding is not just one of creating a
government for a free people, but of creating a government strong
enough to maintain freedom.
Second, the allocation of powers among the institutions was not
haphazard. I would like to suggest the heretical idea that the doctrine of separation of powers rests on a doctrine about the nature of
different powers. While there were disagreements about the exact
nature of each power, the leading founders believed that there was
such a thing as an executive power, a legislative power, and a judicial power. In understanding our Constitution, we should not be so
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sophisticated as to ignore that the framers began by housing each
power largely in a different institution. The executive power, vested
in the President, was understood as a broad power to act with discretion for the security of the Nation, especially in the conduct of
foreign affairs. It was a grant of power given to the President.
Third, the framers did not vest all of each power exclusively in
three distinct branches. They shared or divided some of the powers
among two or more branches. They did so for reasons that they
explained. No reasonable case had ever been made for vesting all of
the power exclusively in each branch. Sharing in some cases can
improve government, and sharing paradoxically provides an important means for each branch to protect its independence against possible encroachments by the others.
Thus, it is perfectly correct to say that the President does not
possess the exclusive control of the executive power. No one disputes this point. The Congress, for example, declares war, and the
Senate must ratify treaties. But the fact that the Constitution provides for the sharing of certain powers in no way negates the fact
that it also vests a general power in each branch. The "executive
power," as article II of the Constitution tells us, is vested in the
President. It is reasonable to conclude that the President has a constitutional claim to all of the executive power not expressly distributed elsewhere by the Constitution. Since Professor Schlesinger
cited Alexander Hamilton in explaining that under the Constitution
the President is not accorded "the sole disposal" of the conduct of
foreign affairs, it is appropriate here to cite Hamilton's general rule
for interpreting constitutional powers: "The general doctrine of
our Constitution then is, that the executive power of the nation is
vested in the President; subject only to the exceptions and qualifications, which are expressed in the instrument."**
The meaning of this analysis in the most general terms is that
while it is not false to say we have a government of "separated institutions sharing power," neither should we regard this statement as
the deepest truth about our system. We have a government of separated institutions, each one endowed with a separate fundamental
power, after which some of the powers are explicitly mixed and
shared. That formulation may not be as felicitous as Professor Neustadt's, but I believe it is more accurate.
In a more practical sense, where does this allocation of power
*
DEN Cy

Hamilton, First Letter of Pacficus, in R. HIRSCHFIELD, TIlE POWER OF THE PRESI55 (2d ed. 1968) (emphasis in original).
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leave us in the conduct of foreign policy? Let me set aside any idea
that it points to a total compartmentalization of the conduct of foreign policy. Even if we had an absolutely rigorous separation of
powers in the Constitution, which we do not, it would still not follow
that the Executive could act on his own. The essence of the separation of powers is that some powers, even when different, conflict.
British monarchs could declare a war, but they might eventually
need Parliament to fund it. A power is something to be claimed,
asserted, and, if need be, used against the powers of another
institution.
What is most striking in constitutional debates today is the bizarre argument that because the Constitution entails conflict in the
conduct of foreign affairs, the President should not employ his
strongest weapon in that conflict. To be sure, a President will want
congressional support in all areas where he can have it, and it would
be foolish for him to court conflict where he can win consent. But
there are occasions when the President may want to use his executive power nakedly, in the absence of or contrary to congressional
will. The President obviously runs a risk here, for he takes on an
institution that has weapons of its own to employ in a struggle. A
President may lose and may pay a tremendous political price. But to
grant this is not to deny that he has a power, that he should protect
that power, and that he may exercise it, even at his own peril.
Finally, I would like to express my agreement with Professor
Schlesinger on his defense of the Constitution against those who
would seek to replace it with a parliamentary system. Yet I believe
that while his defense of the principle of separation of powers is
right, it is right for the wrong reasons. Over the long run our system with its strong President has an advantage over a parliamentary
system in foreign affairs, because it allows not for less but for
greater vigor and efficiency with regard to the most vital instances of
the exercise of discretionary power. This argument, however, is for
another day.

